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1503 
Article 
The Political Economy of Judging 
Thomas Brennan†  
Lee Epstein‡  
Nancy Staudt†‡ 
When John G. Roberts took the oath of office in September 
2005 as the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, the unemployment rate stood at 5.0%.1 Over 
three years later, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates the 
unemployment rate is 8.5%;2 in terms of raw data, the number 
of individuals seeking employment has increased from roughly 
7.5 to 12.5 million in forty-one months.3 Various other business 
cycle facts also indicate the nation is in the midst of an econom-
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 1. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment 
Statistics for Previous Years (Recent Months), http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/ 
SurveyOutputServlet?series_id=LNS14000000 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 2. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situ-
ation Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2009) (providing the unemployment data from March 2009). 
 3. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Unemployed, http://research 
.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/UNEMPLOY.txt (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (listing 
unemployment numbers from 1948 to the present).  
 1504 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1503 
 
ic downturn: consumer prices rose roughly 6.7% over the last 
forty-one months;4 the capacity utilization rate for total indus-
try fell from 78.9 to 70.2%;5 and the budget deficit increased 
from 2.6 to 2.9% of the GDP.6 Indeed, even qualitative meas-
ures have been signaling national economic problems. Consum-
er confidence, as measured by the Michigan Consumer Senti-
ment Index, fell by more than twenty-six points between 2005 
and 2008.7 It is no surprise, therefore, that macroeconomists 
have officially declared the nation to be in a recession—nearly 
every available measure suggests the economy has moved from 
a state of prosperity to one of contraction and decline.8 
In light of these data, it is no surprise that economic issues 
replaced foreign policy as the main concern of voters in the 
2008 election.9 It is equally unsurprising that elected politi-
cians have sought to address the growing “economic crisis”10 in 
an effort to stabilize markets.11 The executive branch, for ex-
ample, has taken a series of extreme measures, such as the res-
cue of Bear Stearns and the takeover of Fannie Mae, Freddie 
 
 4. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price 
Index: All Urban Consumers, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Consumer Price Index] (listing Consum-
er Price Index data since 1913).  
 5. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Capacity Utilization: Total Indus-
try, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) 
(listing capacity utilization percentages since 1967). 
 6. For a graph charting the federal budget deficit as a percentage of 
GDP, see Brookings Institution, Federal Budget Deficit as a Percentage of 
GDP, 1962–2082,  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2008/0331_ 
fiscalfuture/0331_fiscalfuture_deficit.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 7. UNIV. OF MICH., CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX (2008), http://www.sca 
.isr.umich.edu (to access this database, first log in; then select “Tables” and 
then “Historical;” then choose “2008 Annual Table 1” on the pull down menu to 
access the most relevant information) [hereinafter CONSUMER SENTIMENT IN-
DEX]. 
 8. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.  
 9. See Beth Braverman, Voters Favor Obama’s Economic Policy-Poll, 
CNNMoney.com, June 12, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/12/news/ 
economy/president_poll/index.htm (suggesting that voters and the press are 
focused on the economy and only a major international event could shift focus 
back to foreign policy).  
 10. George Stephanopoulus, Greenspan to Stephanopoulus: This Is ‘By 
Far’ the Worst Economic Crisis He’s Seen in His Career, ABCNEWS, Sept. 14, 
2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/09/greenspan-to-st.html. 
 11. See Robert Gavin, It May Take Trillions to Right Economy: Obama 
Calls for New Approach, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2009, at B7. 
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Mac, and the American International Group.12 Members of 
Congress have also sought to ease the crisis with legislation 
that would infuse private markets with capital and at the same 
time increase federal agency power and discretion to assist in-
dividuals harmed by the current economic conditions.13  
In this Article, we investigate whether macroeconomic fac-
tors also affect decision makers in the unelected branch of gov-
ernment: the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. At first cut, 
one might inquire why we should expect any such effects; after 
all, the Justices have no authority whatsoever to adopt fiscal or 
monetary policy intended to relieve the economic pressures fac-
ing the nation—this power lies solely in the hands of the Presi-
dent and the members of Congress.14 The Court, however, rou-
tinely decides cases and controversies that implicate the 
national economy15 and for this reason the Justices may be able 
to play a role, albeit minor, in the nation’s recovery. In fact, a 
significant portion of the Court’s docket is comprised of legal 
disputes that are directly and indirectly associated with the fi-
nancial well-being of the federal government, business entities, 
and private individuals.16 Moreover, litigants are not shy about 
bringing the state of the economy to the Court’s attention: their 
briefs are replete with references to macroeconomic issues such 
as “economic crisis,”17 “banking crisis,”18 “housing crisis,”19 
“high inflation,”20 “serious unemployment,”21 and so forth. The 
 
 12. See James Rosen, Fiscal Hawks Say Bailouts Are Killing Free Market: 
Lawmakers Have Little Chance to Stop Government Expansion in Form of 
Company Rescues, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Sept. 21, 2008, at A5. 
 13. See David Cho & Michael A. Fletcher, Stimulus Pitch Absorbs Agenda: 
White House Delays Bailout Details, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2009, at A1. 
 14. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 196–99 (4th ed. 1997) (noting 
Congress’s appropriation powers and the Executive’s responsibility to formu-
late budget estimates).  
 15. See FISHER, supra note 14, at 197 (noting cases of judicial supervision 
over appropriations). 
 16. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, 
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 87–92 (4th ed. 1997).  
 17. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 32, E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 
230 (1945) (No. 62). 
 18. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (No. 84-1972).  
 19. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, Parker v. Porter, 329 U.S. 531 
(1947) (No. 80). 
 20. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant at 9, Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360 
(1988) (No. 86-1471). 
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parties consistently refer to these issues and to national eco-
nomic factors in presenting their legal arguments in the hopes 
of convincing the Justices that they are well-positioned to ease 
existing economic problems—and should use their power for 
this purpose. 
But do the Justices pay heed? Do they respond to the busi-
ness cycles that regularly occur in the economy? Existing theo-
ries of the Court lead to a range of different expectations and 
hypotheses. If, on the one hand, the Justices’ primary goal is to 
give correct responses to difficult legal questions (what some 
call a legal model)22 or if their aim is to advance their own polit-
ical preferences (the political or attitudinal model),23 the an-
swer is no: the state of the economy—good, bad, or somewhere 
in between—will not play much of a role in their decisions.24 If, 
on the other hand, the Justices care as much about economic 
growth and stability as do the nation’s elected political officials 
(the economic model), the answer is yes.25 More specifically, if 
the Justices seek to advance, or at least avoid interference 
with, the programs and policies implemented to turn the econ-
omy around, they are likely to adopt a position of heightened 
deference to the federal government in recessionary periods.26 
The Justices, in short, will shift away from factors that typical-
ly motivate decision making and will work as a team with the 
elected branches of government in the effort to advance nation-
al economic goals.27 
Understanding which, if any, of these three models charac-
terizes the relationship between Supreme Court decision mak-
ing and economic conditions is worthwhile for both scholars and 
policymakers. First, students of the Court have long argued 
that legal,28 political,29 and institutional30 factors affect judicial 
outcomes, but few scholars have investigated the possible ef-
fects of economic issues on judicial decision making. If the 
 
 21. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 152, R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 
295 U.S. 330 (1935) (No. 566). 
 22. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48–50 (2002).  
 23. See id. at 92–97. 
 24. See infra Parts I.A, I.B. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. See infra notes 32–70 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part I.C. 
 28. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 48.  
 29. Id. at 87. 
 30. See id. at 103. 
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economy affects federal courts in a systematic fashion, then our 
understanding of the judicial system and the means by which 
the Justices reach their decisions is seriously incomplete. 
Second, because the Court decides hundreds of cases involving 
important economic issues,31 it is possible that its decisions fa-
cilitate—or frustrate—the economic policies pursued by the 
other branches of government. Understanding and adjusting 
for this possible impact is crucial if Congress and the President 
hope to implement successful macroeconomic policy. 
This Article hopes to develop such an understanding by ex-
ploring the possible correlation between macroeconomic condi-
tions and economic decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in cas-
es in which the United States or one of its agencies is a party. 
Part I briefly describes how each of the three accounts—legal, 
political, and economic—answers the question of whether the 
Court responds to macro-level events. Because we limit our 
analysis to cases involving the United States, we also consider 
how each account treats the Solicitor General, the lawyer ap-
pointed to represent the U.S. government in the high Court.32 
As we explain below, the legal theory suggests a high level of 
judicial deference to the Solicitor General, but this deference is 
constant and unchanging irrespective of national economic 
conditions.33 The political theory argues that the Justices defer 
to the Solicitor General but only when his views are aligned 
with those of the Court and, once again, economic cycles are ir-
relevant.34 Finally, the economic model focuses on the business 
cycle and theorizes that in recessionary periods, the Court will 
adopt a position of heightened deference to the Solicitor in an 
effort to work jointly with the other branches of government to 
promote growth and stability, irrespective of existing legal doc-
trine and individual policy preferences.35 
Part II explains our plan to assess these competing theo-
ries, and Part III describes the results of our empirical investi-
gation. In brief, we find that all three models fail to character-
ize fully or aptly the Court’s response to the macroeconomy. In 
contrast to the predictions of the legal approach, judicial parti-
san preferences affect decision making, as does the state of the 
 
 31. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16. 
 32. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF 
LAW 1 (1992). 
 33. See infra Part I.A. 
 34. See infra Part I.B. 
 35. See infra Part I.C. 
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economy36—a finding that also works against the political mod-
el. But the economic account, at least as we have presented it 
here, fails too. We find that as the economy contracts, deference 
to the Solicitor General (and thus the federal government) de-
creases; it does not increase as we expected.37  
In Part IV, we attempt to account for this seemingly para-
doxical finding with a simple conjecture: the Justices perceive 
recessions as a signal of the federal government’s incompetence 
in the context of economic policymaking and in response adopt 
a position of decreased deference to the government. The idea 
that the economy operates as a signal with respect to policy 
competence is not a new idea, of course. Numerous studies have 
documented voters’ propensity to view declining economic con-
ditions as a cue of incompetence which, in turn, leads to more 
votes in favor of an incumbent’s competitor and an increased 
loss rate for incumbents generally.38 Our findings suggest the 
Court acts in much the same way: the Justices use their deci-
sion power to punish elected federal officials in recessionary pe-
riods and to reward them in times of prosperity.  
I.  COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF THE COURT’S RESPONSE 
TO ECONOMIC UP(DOWN) TURNS   
In what follows, we review several accounts of judicial de-
cision making both generally and in the specific context of our 
concerns—economic decision making in cases in which the fed-
eral government is a party. This last aspect of the study is cru-
cial because, as we shall see, the relative degree of deference to 
the United States posited by each account helps us to distin-
guish them for purposes of assessing their ability to character-
ize Court decision making in times of economic downturns and 
upturns. 
A. IMPLEMENTING LEGAL DOCTRINE  
One of the oldest and most well-known theories of judicial 
decision making assumes that Justices privilege existing legal 
tenets and doctrine when rendering opinions in cases and con-
 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. See Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Economic Conditions, Causal Attribu-
tions, and Political Evaluations in the 1984 Presidential Election, 50 J. POL. 
848, 848 (1988) (listing several studies that have found that economic indica-
tors influence congressional election results and presidential popularity rat-
ings).  
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troversies.39 Under this theory, the Justices are neutral decid-
ers who look to the U.S. Constitution, legislative statutes, judi-
cial precedent, and various other legally relevant materials in 
an effort to maximize correct answers to the legal issues pre-
sented.40 This theory does not imply that the Justices have no 
personal preferences41 or are always in agreement with the 
controlling legal precedent,42 but instead holds that they are 
willing to set their views aside for the greater social good.43 
Many scholars and jurists subscribing to this theory believe, for 
example, that judicial obedience to and compliance with the 
law leads to the uniform treatment of litigants and thus a per-
ception of fairness.44 Moreover, law and doctrine is arguably 
valuable because it enables individuals to predict outcomes and 
this, in turn, permits an understanding of social and business 
interactions, allows reliance on expectations, creates disincen-
tives to litigate every conflict, and ultimately deters expending 
private and judicial resources.45 Finally, many argue that ad-
 
 39. For background discussion on the legal model, see SEGAL & SPAETH, 
supra note 22, at 48–85. 
 40. Id. at 48–49; Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The For-
ward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 & 
n.20 (1994) (noting that the overwhelming scholarly and judicial view on cor-
rect outcomes is that they reflect adherence to superior court rulings); Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrainted Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1612–13 (1995). 
 41. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 49–50.  
 42. Evan Caminker explains this as follows:  
Deference need not be based on the assumption that the first court 
reached the correct result. Rather, the doctrines of stare decisis and 
hierarchical precedent are based on the realization that various insti-
tutional and substantive values are served if . . . prior interpretations 
(whether correct or not) are maintained into the present and future. 
Caminker, supra note 40, at 27 n.99. 
 43. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a 
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 835–40 (2003) (provid-
ing a brief discussion of the values in federal court decision making and in the 
standing context in particular). 
 44. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (1988) (asserting that 
the strongest rationale for binding precedent is its usefulness in assuring like 
cases are treated alike); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 69–72 (1961) (noting the link be-
tween fairness and binding precedent); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path De-
pendence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–54 (2001) (“[T]he doctrine of stare deci-
sis is an appeal to a general principle of equality, a cousin [to] the Kantian 
principle of universalizability and the biblical Golden Rule.”). 
 45. WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 60–73 (stating that precedent is use-
ful because it enables certainty, reliance, and efficiency that would otherwise 
be impossible); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. 
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herence to the law fosters respect for the judiciary because it 
demonstrates that the Justices draw on a body of law that 
represents collective experience over time rather than upon 
their own political and ideological viewpoints.46  
Litigant briefs and oral arguments made in Court are an 
important aid to the Justices in their search for the best legal 
answers to the problems presented. Petitioners and respon-
dents both present the facts and law in a manner that advances 
their own interests, and while this arguably leads to some bias, 
it also enables the Justices to gain an understanding of the 
strongest argument for each position, thereby facilitating high-
quality decision making.47 Generally, both parties are on equal 
footing in Court, but, as noted above, there is one prominent 
exception—the Justices historically have exhibited quite a bit 
of trust and confidence in the position taken by the United 
States as evidenced by a high level of deference in the opinions 
rendered. Throughout history, the federal government has pre-
vailed in roughly 65% of all the cases it has litigated, and this 
win rate increases to 70% in cases involving economic issues.48 
Many scholars argue this deference is both reasonable and 
rational. The Solicitor General represents the U.S. government 
in nearly all the cases in which the U.S. government is a party; 
he is a repeat player with substantial legal expertise on the is-
sues at hand and has a reputation for providing unbiased in-
formation.49 The Solicitor General’s legal arguments, therefore, 
are more useful and trustworthy to the Court in its effort to 
build sound legal doctrine than other parties who appear infre-
quently and have no reputational concerns other than winning 
the case for the particular client at hand.50 Indeed, the Justices 
have such a high level of faith in the Solicitor General’s ability 
to present informed and balanced legal arguments that they 
sometimes invite him to present views in cases in which the 
 
L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (stating that predictability in judicial decision making 
is a key rationale for adhering to precedent). 
 46. See Hathaway, supra note 44, at 652 (arguing that the public will view 
judicial decision making as fair and not capricious if it is based on precedent). 
 47. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 114–15 (stating that, through 
the lens of equity, a judge can make a more justifiable decision by taking ac-
count of the litigants’ interests).  
 48. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl 
.edu/index.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Supreme Court Data-
base]. 
 49. SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 1–2.  
 50. Id. at 31. 
 2009] POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING 1511 
 
United States is not even involved.51 In short, the Justices ap-
pear to view themselves as a team with the other branches of 
federal government in their effort to build a rational system of 
law and doctrine.52  
How does this team theory of legal adjudication account for 
macroeconomic trends? The answer: macroeconomic trends are 
completely irrelevant to the decision-making process. The 
Court’s sole responsibility is to assure that government policies 
comply with the mandates of relevant federal laws, and absent 
a legal breach, the Court will uphold the government activity 
as entirely legitimate.53 The legal model, in its most extreme 
form, gives no consideration to the individual views of the Jus-
tices themselves or to national political, economic, or cultural 
trends unless they are embedded into the law by way of the ma-
joritarian process.54 To do otherwise would be to undermine the 
very purpose of the legal approach: Justices would be forced to 
study the economy before reaching decisions rather than mere-
ly applying the relevant law; similarly situated litigants would 
be denied uniform treatment in the courtroom; and perceptions 
of fairness would be undermined.55 In short, if economic cycles 
could alter judicial interpretation of the laws, litigants would 
be governed by the economy and not law at all.  
Similarly, because the legal theory of the Court assumes 
the Justices rely on the Solicitor General for his legal expertise, 
there is no reason to expect economic factors will be correlated 
to an increase or decrease in judicial deference to the positions 
taken by the U.S. government. Or put differently, knowledge of 
law and doctrine is not likely to be correlated with a growing 
(or shrinking) economy and thus there is no rationale for the 
Court to alter its view of the Solicitor General in the decision-
making process. He is equally valuable in economic peaks and 
troughs. 
 
 51. See id. at 134–50 (discussing the government’s role as a friend of the 
court). 
 52. See infra Part I.C. 
 53. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 48 (stating that the basic legal 
model holds that precedents, statutes, the Constitution, and original intent 
guide decisions). 
 54. See id. at 48–49. 
 55. Cf. WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 60–74 (discussing the benefits of 
subscribing to precedent in terms of certainty, reliance, equality, and efficien-
cy).  
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B. ADVANCING POLITICAL PREFERENCES  
The constrained (and some would argue naive) legal theory 
discussed immediately above competes with the political or at-
titudinal theory of judicial decision making, which assumes 
that Justices have political preferences and seek to embed 
these preferences into the opinions they render.56 This theory 
does not ignore precedent or law-related factors, but views the 
development of doctrine as a means for implementing political 
and ideological viewpoints and for keeping lower court judges 
in line.57 Unlike the legal theory, however, the political theory 
of adjudication does not assume that legal doctrine reflects in-
evitable, neutral, or fair outcomes after full consideration of the 
legal issues brought into court; doctrine is merely a mechanism 
to realize judicial politics.58 The assumption that the Justices 
pursue their own goals and aims does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that individual Justices have little regard for 
others and no respect for the rule of law;59 the point of the polit-
ical theory is that the Justices do not become objective decision 
makers who check their personal opinions on legal controver-
sies at the courtroom door.60 Instead, the Justices have person-
al viewpoints and give them weight when issuing decisions.61  
 
 56. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 86; McNollgast, Politics and 
the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636–37 (1995) (McNollgast is the collective name used by 
Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast when writing together) 
(stating the assumption that judges do not check their politics at the cour-
troom door but rather act to bring policy as close as possible to their own pre-
ferred outcome). 
 57. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puz-
zle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 79–80 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme 
Court uses legal doctrine as a signal to lower courts about the range of opi-
nions and outcomes that it will tolerate); Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate 
Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Historical Perspective, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 143, 145–50 (2003) (discussing the operation of preference and le-
gal rules in appellate review); McNollgast, supra note 56, at 1641–56 (discuss-
ing precedent as a reflection of political preferences).  
 58. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 92. 
 59. See McNollgast, supra note 56, at 1636.  
 60. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 121 (1995) (arguing that 
judges seek to “impose their political vision on society” through opinions and 
rulings, just as an artist imposes an aesthetic vision on society through art); 
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1472 (2001). 
 61. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818–23 (1994) (discussing situations in 
which judges adhered to their own idiosyncratic political or legal views despite 
clear Supreme Court precedent to the contrary and noting scholars’ diverse 
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The political theory of judicial decision making does not 
anticipate the same role for litigant briefs and arguments as 
seen in the context of the legal theory; briefs and presentations 
are only useful if they advance the ideological viewpoints of the 
Court. Similarly, the Solicitor General does not have a privi-
leged status in a politically oriented courtroom.62 The Justices, 
of course, may award special deference to the Solicitor General, 
but only in circumstances in which his position is closely 
aligned with the preferences of the Court and not because of his 
ability to assist in the development of sound legal doctrine. Ab-
sent this alignment, the United States will get little or no pre-
ferential treatment and will be treated as any other litigant in 
the Court. Scholars (and jurists) subscribing to or acknowledg-
ing the role of judicial politics in the decision-making process 
forecast that the Justices will systematically vote for one party 
over another.63 In economic cases, for example, the government 
is widely viewed to represent liberal views and thus liberal Jus-
tices will show an increased propensity to cast votes in favor of 
the Solicitor General while conservative Justices are likely to 
do just the opposite. In criminal cases, by contrast, conserva-
tives are expected to favor the arguments presented by the So-
licitor General, while the liberal Justices are expected to favor 
the individual accused of violating the law.64 
Like the legal model of the Court, the political model leaves 
no room for macroeconomic factors to affect judicial outcomes. 
The Justices, of course, may have strong partisan positions on 
macroeconomic policymaking; various scholars, for example, 
have theorized that members of left-wing parties are more con-
cerned with unemployment and growth and relatively less con-
cerned with inflation, while members of right-wing parties have 
just the opposite preferences.65 But these preferences show up 
 
reactions); cf. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–33 (1994) (arguing that if a court believes the 
Constitution and precedent are in conflict, it should ignore the precedent).  
 62. See generally SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 174–80 (discussing the office 
of Solicitor General as a mediator between the executive and judicial 
branches). 
 63. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 86 (“This model holds that the 
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the 
ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”). 
 64. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological 
Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 
1803–04 (2006). 
 65. See ALBERT ALESINA ET AL., POLITICAL CYCLES AND THE MACRO-
ECONOMY 47 (1997). 
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in the judicial decision-making process by way of systematic 
choices in favor of the government or private individuals and do 
not change with economic contractions and expansions. Indeed, 
judicial theorists subscribing to the political theory assume 
that ideological preferences are stable throughout the Justices’ 
careers66 and thus cannot shift with the business cycle. Al-
though this stability assumption is not explicit in the extant li-
terature, it can be found in nearly all the existing measures of 
judicial preference and ideology as well in the empirical tests of 
the judicial decision making. Recently, teams of scholars have 
begun to question the widespread assumption of preference 
stability but no scholar has yet offered a theory to explain why 
or when the Justices will alter their political viewpoints.67  
C.  PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 
As we suggest above, various approaches to decision mak-
ing stress political or legal motivations, or some combination 
thereof. But it is possible these goals are privileged primarily in 
periods of economic stability and growth. When the economy 
sours and the nation is threatened with widespread economic 
harm, there is reason to expect a shift in judicial behavior. Spe-
cifically, given the large number of economic cases on the dock-
et and the Court’s role in contributing to national policy 
through its review of government programs,68 it is possible that 
the Justices will set aside their customary objectives in order to 
work as a team with the other branches of federal government 
in a combined effort to avoid prolonged and severe periods of 
economic setbacks.69 Theorizing that the Justices are likely to 
increase their level of cooperation with the elected branches of 
 
 66. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme 
Court Justices from Different Periods, 42 W. POL. Q. 509, 513 (1989). 
 67. See Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudin-
al Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 806–08 (1998); Lee 
Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1502–15 (2007) [hereinafter 
Epstein et al., Ideological Drift]. 
 68. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16. 
 69. Scholars such as Lewis Kornhauser and Steve Shavell have used team 
models to explain or investigate the hierarchical structure of the courts. See 
Lewis Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource Constrained Team, 68 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1605 (1995); Steve Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error 
Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995). No scholar, however, investigated 
the possibility that the team theory of decision making may explain alignment 
of preferences between the separate but coequal branches of federal govern-
ment. 
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government in periods of national economic uncertainty does 
not lead to the conclusion that the Justices suddenly become al-
truistic or completely lose their well-defined beliefs and atti-
tudes—they do not.70 Rather, this theory of cooperation, 
sparked by economic downturns, implies that the advantages 
associated with putting the economy back on track begin to ex-
ceed those associated with the legal, political, and institutional 
interests pursued in better economic times. 
The notion that the Justices’ utility is linked to their level 
of teamwork with Congress and the President is consistent 
with much of the existing literature on the Court. A number of 
political and economic theorists have adopted the team model 
to investigate and explain various features of the federal judi-
ciary,71 and as noted above, the legal theory of judicial decision 
making itself is grounded in the idea that the Justices care very 
much about the development of the law and eagerly work with 
the other branches of the government, via deference to the Soli-
citor General, to create sound legal doctrine.72 Accordingly, a 
revised model of the Court that theorizes that the Justices’ ob-
jectives include the promotion of economic growth and stability 
through greater cooperation with federal policymakers simply 
expands team theory into a new, heretofore unexplored venue.  
Moreover, just as the idea that the Court will at times en-
gage in a team effort to advance broad social goals is not new, 
the idea that exposure or vulnerability to harm or loss increas-
es individuals’ desire to cooperate is not novel. This dynamic—
perceived vulnerability leading to increased levels of coopera-
tion—has been observed in many contexts in both the private 
and public spheres.73 Various scholars explain the phenomenon 
by noting the widespread belief that individual utility is direct-
ly linked to group effort in times of perceived threat;74 others 
 
 70. See Dean Tjosvold, Cooperation Theory, Constructive Controversy, and 
Effectiveness: Learning From Crisis, in TEAM EFFECTIVENESS AND DECISION 
MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 79, 88–89 (Richard A. Guzzo & Eduardo Salas 
eds., 1995). 
 71. See Kornhauser, supra note 69, at 1605–07. 
 72. See SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 151–52. 
 73. See LAWRENCE BARTON, CRISIS IN ORGANIZATION: MANAGING AND 
COMMUNICATING 2–4 (1993) (discussing crisis-management as a discipline and 
exploring the effects of crisis on different entities); ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND 
LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
17–18 (1987); Tjosvold, supra note 70, at 88–90. 
 74. See generally BARTON, supra note 73, at 32–37 (discussing the impor-
tance of developing a crisis management plan in creating a cooperative ap-
proach to crisis); Tjosvold, supra note 70, at 86–92. 
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argue that cooperation can be explained by the improved guid-
ance and direction that tend to emerge from group leaders in 
times of stress.75 But few scholars who study cooperation and 
teamwork question its existence and its increased level in times 
of crisis. Indeed, when it comes to federal lawmaking, a number 
of economic historians have noted the readiness of policymak-
ers to set aside partisan and ideological conflict in order to un-
ite the government and to better address national emergen-
cies.76  
The reality of increased cooperation within federal policy 
circles in times of perceived danger is not always viewed as a 
normative good. Professor Robert Higgs, for example, is highly 
critical of this observed teamwork, taking the position that it 
has led to an inexorable expansion of the federal government 
that is impossible to reverse.77 Others question whether coop-
eration in the federal-policy context in times of national insta-
bility or crisis is problematic because it undermines the debate 
and conflict that is essential to a working and successful de-
mocracy.78 In this Article we do not question the normative 
value of federal policymakers’ teamwork, but note as a descrip-
tive matter that this teamwork emerges in periods of perceived 
national threat and that the expectation of cooperation is likely 
to exist among all federal law and policymakers, including the 
Justices, for the reasons described above.  
Cooperation and teamwork do not mean the Court will 
work alongside Congress and the President to identify creative 
solutions to the macroeconomic policy problems facing the na-
tion. Rather, it is far more likely that cooperation, if it exists, 
will emerge in the form of increased deference to the U.S. gov-
ernment in the cases in which it is a party. Recall that the Jus-
tices are legal and constitutional experts and are unlikely to 
have any economic expertise, or very little of it.79 With limited 
 
 75. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1670–74 (2003); Lynn A. Stout, Judges and 
Altruistic Heirarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1624–25 (2002). 
 76. HIGGS, supra note 73, at 17–18, 67–74; HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1–4 (2007), available at 
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6216.pdf. 
 77. HIGGS, supra note 73, at 67–74.  
 78. See Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balanc-
ing the Executive’s Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1453, 1453–57 (1979). 
 79. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 263–398 (providing da-
ta on Justices’ backgrounds). 
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information and know-how, the Court will not seek to partici-
pate in the creation of new macroeconomic policy but will defer 
to the elected branches of government that have the ability, ex-
perience, and knowledge to address economic issues.80 If the 
Justices increase their level of cooperation, then we should ex-
pect the U.S. government to prevail in many more of the cases 
it litigates during recessionary periods. In short, the arguments 
made by the Solicitor General will become more trustworthy 
and reliable given that he represents the views of federal poli-
cymakers, experts in the nation’s finances. 
The notion that the Justices pursue economic stability and 
growth through increased deference to the federal government 
in recessionary periods offers a theoretical account for Court 
scholars who have questioned the long-standing assumption 
that Justices display preference stability throughout their ca-
reers.81 If the Justices indeed do modify their decision making 
to take account of national economic cycles, then we would ex-
pect ideological drift: both liberal and conservative Justices will 
show an increased propensity to favor the federal government 
when the economy turns sour. Because decisions that work in 
favor of the government are perceived as liberal if rendered in 
the economic context, the theory would suggest that, condition-
al on an economic downturn, the Court will systematically ex-
hibit greater liberalness, but upon economic recovery, the Jus-
tices will revert to their prior—more conservative—preferences.  
II.  ASSESSING THE ACCOUNTS   
In this Part, we empirically interrogate the various ac-
counts presented above, with particular focus on the economic 
model. Part II.A describes the data collection process; Part II.B 
explains our statistical models and our predictions; and Part 
II.C presents the findings. As we previewed, the results indi-
cate that the Court responds to changes in the economy—but 
not in the way any of the accounts suggest. In periods of declin-
ing economic conditions, the Court is less likely to defer to the 
federal government than in times of prosperity.  
 
 80. Cf. FARROKH K. LANGDANA, MACROECONOMIC POLICY (2002) (provid-
ing an overview of the macroeconomic issues that must be taken into account 
in forming a coherent economic policy). 
 81. See Epstein et al., Ideological Drift, supra note 67, at 1484–87. 
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A.  DATA COLLECTION 
We collected the data in three steps. First, for purposes of 
gathering information on Supreme Court decisions, we relied 
on Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database (covering 
the 1953–2007 terms).82 Given our focus, we retained only 
those cases: (1) in which the U.S. government or a federal agen-
cy was a party; and (2) that involved economic regulation—
including taxation, securities, and antitrust.83 As a result of 
this culling process, the dataset includes 827 cases; the gov-
ernment prevailed (coded 1) in 580 (70%) of these cases.84 The 
question, of course, is whether this win rate is constant over 
time (as the legal model would predict),85 or whether it is corre-
lated at statistically significant levels with either national eco-
nomic contractions and expansions (consistent with the eco-
nomic model) or the political values of the Justices (as the 
political model predicts).86 
The second step of our data collection process consisted of 
amassing information on the state of the macroeconomy. What 
we hope to tap into is the business cycle: the repeated sequence 
of economic expansion, giving way to a decline, and then fol-
lowed by recovery.87 From the relevant literature, we know that 
various macroeconomic variables are associated with this cycle, 
including industrial production, consumption, investment, em-
ployment, inflation, and stock prices.88 Nearly all of these fac-
tors, often called business cycle facts, are procyclical in the 
sense that they move in the same direction as the aggregate 
economic activity, although unemployment is countercyclical 
and real interest rates are acyclical.89 In addition to timing, 
some of the variables, such as investment activity, tend to lead 
aggregate business activity (it moves in advance of the business 
cycle), while others are coincident, such as consumption and 
employment; others such as inflation are lagging; still others, 
such as unemployment, are unclassified with respect to tim-
 
 82. Supreme Court Database, supra note 48.  
 83. These are represented by values 7, 8, and 12 in the Spaeth Supreme 
Court Database. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See supra Part I.A. 
 86. See supra Parts I.B, I.C. 
 87. ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 289 (2d ed. 
1995).  
 88. Id. at 300–14. 
 89. Id. at 312. 
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ing.90 For purposes of this investigation, we focus on the eco-
nomic peaks and troughs as identified by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) Dating Committee,91 the percen-
tage change in inflation from month to month,92 the percentage 
change in employment from month to month,93 and the percen-
tage change in real quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP).94 
We also included two variables that tap into the general “mood” 
of the public with respect to the economy. The first is a meas-
ure of consumer confidence and the second measures consumer 
expectations with respect to prices as reported by the Reu-
ters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.95 A simple 
correlation table suggests that the official statistics are highly 
correlated with the mood measures and in the expected direc-
tion.96  
We also gathered data on the partisan preferences of the 
Court, specifically, the proportion of the Justices appointed by 
Republican Presidents. Theoretically this variable could range 
from 0 to 1, but in fact the proportion of Republican-appointed 
Justices in the dataset ranges from 0.22 to 0.89. Our idea, in 
line with various political accounts of decision making, is that 
(at least for our time frame) a Court dominated by Republican 
appointees is less likely to support government efforts to regu-
late the economy than a Court populated by Democrats.97 Along 
a similar vein, we incorporated a variable indicating whether or 
 
 90. Id. at 300–14. 
 91. See Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [he-
reinafter Business Cycle]. 
 92. See Consumer Price Index, supra note 4. 
 93. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment 
Hours and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey, 
http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Em-
ployment Hours and Earnings]. 
 94. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts: Cur-
rent-Dollar and “Real” GDP, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (se-
lect link called “Current-Dollar and ‘Real’ GDP”) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) 
[hereinafter “Real” GDP]. 
 95. See CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX, supra note 7. 
 96. For more information about the data sets the authors created for their 
research, consider consulting the project’s website, which contains many of the 
data sets and empirical research that provide the basis for these conclusions. 
See Replication Archive, http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/ 
PoliticalEconomy.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). Those interested in studying 
these issues in greater depth should visit the website and contact the authors.  
 97. In our database, Democratic courts decided fifty-nine percent of the 
cases (n=488) and Republican courts decided forty-one percent (n=339). 
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not the United States was the Petitioner or the Respondent in 
the Supreme Court.98 This accounts for the Court’s propensity 
to reverse decisions of the lower courts, which, in turn, may re-
flect strategic-political considerations on the part of the Justic-
es.99 Finally, we included a dummy variable for each decade in 
the dataset in order to pick up possible trends in the judicial 
decision-making process. 
B. STATISTICAL MODELS AND PREDICTIONS 
For purposes of identifying the possible effects of national 
economic conditions on the U.S. Supreme Court, we examine 
the effects of the various macroeconomic variables on the prob-
ability of a win for the federal government. Because the depen-
dent variable is binary100 and because we observe a high level 
of collinearity between the variables of interest,101 we specify 
six separate probit models: 
 
Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β1economic _ cycle j + βXij)  (1) 
 
Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β1inflation j + βXij)  (2) 
 
Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β1employment j + βXij)  (3) 
 
Pr(Yij =1) = Φ(β 0 + β1GDPj + βXij) (4) 
 
Pr(Yij =1) = Φ(β 0 + β1expectation _ inflation j + βXij)  (5) 
 
Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β1consumer _ confidence j + βXij)  (6) 
 
In each model, y is the Court’s outcome in case i in Term j. 
As noted above, all the cases in the database involve the U.S. 
government and are coded as 1 if the government prevails and 
 
 98. See infra p. 123 tbl.1. When the United States was the Petitioner, we 
used the variable 1, and when the United States was the Respondent, we used 
the variable 0. 
 99. See generally Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 393 (1982) (hypothe-
sizing that Justices are more likely to grant certiorari when they disagree with 
the lower court). 
 100. For a discussion of models for binary dependent variables, see J. 
SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPEN-
DENT VARIABLES 34–84 (1997). 
 101. Collinearity between the variables leads to biased point estimates and 
at the same time inflates the error terms. See JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DI-
NARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 89 (4th ed. 1997) (“With perfect or exact col-
linearity the standard errors go to infinity.”). 
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0 if the government loses in Court. In the first model, the vari-
able ß1 is a binary variable coded equal to 1 if the nation is in a 
period of prosperity and coded equal to -1 if the nation is in a 
recessionary period, as determined by the NBER.102 ßX is a vec-
tor of variables, including the proportion of Republican-
appointed Justices on the Court; a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the United States is the appellant, and 0 otherwise; and six 
dummy variables to pick up any possible time trends with re-
spect to judicial decision making.  
In the second model, ß1 is the percentage change in infla-
tion from a month ago;103 in the third model ß1 is the percen-
tage change in employment from a month ago;104 in the fourth 
model ß1 is the percentage change in real quarterly GDP;105 in 
the fifth model ß1 is consumer expectations with respect to per-
centage increase/decrease in prices; in the sixth model ß1 is the 
Reuters/Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, which is meas-
ured on a continuous scale where higher values indicate a 
greater degree of optimism and thus higher levels of expected 
consumer spending.106 ßX represents the same vector of va-
riables described above.  
If the economic approach aptly characterizes the Court’s 
decisions then we expect economic downturns to cause an in-
crease in government win rates. Accordingly, we expect the va-
riables Economic Cycle, Employment, GDP, and Consumer Con-
fidence all to have a negative coefficient (thus recessions, low 
employment rates, low GDP rates, and low levels of consumer 
optimism trend with a high level of pro-government outcomes). 
Similarly, we expect the variables Inflation and Expectated In-
flation to have positive coefficients, indicating that as inflation 
goes up—or as consumers expect prices to increase—the gov-
ernment wins more often. If either the political theory of judi-
cial decision making107 or the legal theory108 is descriptively ac-
curate, we expect all the economic variables to be equal to 0, 
that is, we should observe no macroeconomic effects on Su-
preme Court decision making. 
 
 102. See Business Cycle, supra note 91. Appendix B includes a table listing 
the economic peaks and troughs.  
 103. See Consumer Price Index, supra note 4. 
 104. See Employment Hours and Earnings, supra note 93. 
 105. See “Real” GDP, supra note 94. 
 106. See CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX, supra note 7. 
 107. See supra Part I.B. 
 108. See supra Part I.A. 
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C.  POSSIBLE SELECTION EFFECT 
Before turning to the empirical findings, it is important to 
comment on possible selection effects. For purposes of this es-
say, we conceptualize the effects of economic variables on the 
Court as if they were a “treatment” on the Justices. Economists 
label this type of study a “natural experiment” because the 
treatment arguably arose due to an exogenous event.109 In this 
context, it is clear that the Justices themselves did not cause 
the economic expansion or contraction; indeed, many experts 
argue that identifying the cause of macroeconomic cycles is im-
possible—we know they occur but not what causes them.110 A 
natural experiment or quasi-experiment always has a control 
group, which is not affected by the event, and a treatment 
group, which we believe is affected.111 The behaviors or out-
comes of the two groups are then compared for purposes of 
measuring the affects of the treatment on the population of in-
terest.112 Because the U.S. experienced at least nine recessio-
nary periods from 1953–2006,113 we can think of the study as a 
series of nine natural experiments on the Court. 
The central feature of a classic randomized experiment—
the existence of a control group to estimate what would have 
happened in the absence of the treatment—lies behind the idea 
of a natural experiment, which is what this study relies upon to 
identify the effects of economic conditions.114 In the natural ex-
periment, the researcher must make use of the differences in 
outcomes between the treatment group and a control group, 
just as in a classic experiment, but the treatment status 
emerges through nature rather than at the hand of the scien-
tist.115 The fact that the treatment status in our study was not 
determined by a randomized procedure but by nature, of 
course, raises the possibility that any comparison between the 
 
 109. DAVID CARD & ALAN KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW 
ECONOMIES OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 22–25 (1995) (describing the frequency 
with which economists use natural experiments).  
 110. For a useful discussion of what causes the business cycle and how po-
licymakers should respond, see ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 87, at 282–442. 
 111. CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 109, at 22. 
 112. See id. at 22–25 (explaining how natural experiments work and how 
they differ from other types).  
 113. See Business Cycle, supra note 91. 
 114. See CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 109, at 22–25 (comparing natural 
experiments with typical “hard science” experiments and showing that a con-
trol group is necessary for each type). 
 115. Id. 
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two groups of cases will be biased.116 In order to determine the 
credibility of the natural experiment—to assure unbiased re-
sults—it is important to examine the characteristics of the cas-
es that were placed into the control and treatment groups due 
to the economic downturn that emerged.117 Valid causal infe-
rence requires that the treatment and control groups be iden-
tical on all relevant factors.118 If the two groups differ, then it is 
possible that the observed differences in judicial outcomes have 
nothing to do with the economy and everything to do with the 
type of case litigated in Court or the judicial makeup of the 
Court. 
For purposes of this study, the average changes in inflation 
rates, employment rates, GDP, and consumer confidence are 
quite a bit different in periods of economic contraction and ex-
pansion119—but this is exactly as expected. The politics of the 
Court and the federal government as an appellant, by contrast, 
exhibit similarity under various economic conditions and this 
offers some (albeit limited) evidence for the credibility of this 
natural experiment for assessing the effects of the macroecon-
omy on the Court.  
This comparability cannot identify the unobservables asso-
ciated with possible litigant strategies that shift depending on 
the economic conditions at hand. If either party pursues easier 
(or harder) cases given macroeconomic factors, then this fact 
could explain the empirical results obtained, not the economy 
itself. Moreover, if the macroeconomy affects the Justices’ deci-
sions to grant certiorari or their ultimate decision on the me-
rits, then our empirical findings may be confounded.  
For purposes of this essay, however, we assume that we 
have a legitimate natural experiment. In further research, we 
plan to investigate this important question in order to deter-
mine whether a selection problem in fact exists in the study, 
thereby potentially raising doubts about the conclusions 
reached here. Indeed, this selection problem may exist in all 
empirical studies of the Supreme Court, but no scholar has sys-
tematically investigated the problem. Accordingly, this is a gap 
 
 116. See id. at 23 (noting the possibility of bias in natural experiments). 
 117. See id. at 23–24 (noting the importance of analyzing the characteris-
tics of the control group). 
 118. See id. (citing the importance of having similarity between the treat-
ment and control groups for the validity of the experiment). 
 119. See infra p. 123 tbl.1.  
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in the literature upon which we will focus and seek to fill not 
only for this particular study, but for all future court studies.120 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS   
With this important caveat noted, we turn to the results of 
our modeling exercise. We find that the variables Cycle, Em-
ployment, Expected Inflation, Government is Petitioner, and 
Proportion Court Republican are all statistically significantly 
correlated with the government’s win rate according to Table 1. 
Recall that we included the variable, Government is Petitioner, 
merely to control for the Court’s propensity to grant certiorari 
to cases in order to reverse them. Our model confirms this, as 
expected, but the finding does not go to the validity of the legal, 
political, or economic model of decision making, so we set this 
variable aside for now. 
As Table 1 indicates, and in line with political accounts121 
(though not with the traditional legal model),122 the Court’s 
partisan composition, as indicated by the variable Proportion 
Court Republican, exerts a significant effect on the govern-
ment’s success rate. Five of the six models indicate that as the 
proportion of Republican appointees on the Court decreases, 
the government is more likely to win. In substantive terms, the 
models suggest that as the Court becomes populated with more 
and more Democratic appointees, the government win rate in-
creases anywhere from 12% to 18%; these estimates are not the 
confidence intervals but the point estimates of the marginal ef-
fects in the models. As noted, however, this finding holds for 
five of the six models; politics does not appear to exert the same 
impact in model 6, which corresponds to a shorter time period 
than the other models, since expected inflation numbers are on-
ly available from 1978 onward. 
What of our chief concern—the macroeconomy? Well, as 
Table 1 shows, nearly every one of the economic variables is in 
the opposite direction than we hypothesized. Moreover, the va-
riables Employment and Expected Inflation are both statistical-
ly significant at the 1% level in the opposite direction predicted! 
 
 120. For a preliminary investigation, see Nancy Staudt & Tyler J. Van-
derWeele, Causal Diagrams for Empirical Legal Research: Methodology for 
Identifying Causation, Avoiding Bias, and Interpreting Results (2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author), available at http://epstein.law 
.northwestern.edu/research/JudicialBehaviorStaudt.pdf. 
 121. See supra Part I.B. 
 122. See supra Part I.A. 
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The variable Cycle is also significant at the 11% level in the op-
posite direction. As the economy cycles into a recession, as em-
ployment rates decrease, and as consumers expect higher levels 
of inflation, the level of deference not only fails to increase, but 
as a statistical matter, it actually decreases. These findings are 
robust in various specifications of the models, with and without 
time lags. 
 
Probit Models
Variable Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model  
6 
Cycle .11 
(.07) 
– – – – – 
Inflation – .03 
(.19) 
– – – – 
Employment – – .41*** 
(.07) 
– – – 
GDP – – – .01 
(.01) 
– – 
Consumer 
Confidence 
– – – – .002 
(.006) 
– 
Expected  
Inflation 
– – – – – -.014*** 
(.001) 
Government  
Is Petitioner 
.48*** 
(.09) 
.48*** 
(.09) 
.48*** 
(.08) 
.48*** 
(.09) 
.48*** 
(.09) 
.34*** 
(.04) 
Proportion 
Court  
Republican 
-.52* 
(.31) 
-.50*** 
(.17) 
-.37 
(.47) 
-.45** 
(.22) 
-.45*** 
(.16) 
.02 
(.17) 
Time  
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant .33* 
(.20) 
.38*** 
(.09) 
.28 
(.23) 
.36*** 
(.13) 
.16 
(.55) 
.29 
(.26) 
N 814 814 814 814 814 299 
Log-
Likelihood 
-477.79 -479.17 -476.26 -479.15 -479.10 -189.45 
Table 1. The Success of the Federal Government in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Economic Cases (1953–2006 Terms). Note: Cell entries are probit 
coefficients with clustered standard errors (by Chief Justice) in parenthesis. 
We generated these estimates using “dprobit” in STATA.  *** indicates p ≤.01, 
** indicates p ≤.05, and * indicates p ≤ .10. The dependent variable is whether 
the U.S. government or a federal agency prevailed (=1) or not (=0). 
 
As a substantive matter, the effects on judicial outcomes 
are quite strong. In particular, changes in the employment rate 
exert a notable impact on the likelihood of a government win. 
We make this point in Figure 1, which shows the predicted 
probability of Republican and Democratic Courts voting in fa-
vor of the government (as the petitioner and respondent) over 
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the range of employment rate changes from month to month, 
with a minimum (worst) (-.66) to a maximum (best) (1.006). 
Note that for both types of Court—Democratic and Republi-
can—the odds of the United States or its agencies prevailing 
fall precipitously as the employment rate decreases, and this 
finding holds whether the U.S government is a petitioner or a 
respondent. At the highest employment rate, our statistical 
model predicts that a Democrat-dominated Court will support 
the government in about nine out of every ten government ap-
peals and roughly seven out of every ten cases in which the 
government is the appellee; when employment rates decrease, 
however, the ratio falls to seven out of every ten cases when the 
government is the appellant and to five out of every ten when 
the government is the appellee. Republican Courts too are far 
less likely to defer to the government in periods of low employ-
ment. When Republican appointees are in control and when 
employment rates reach their lowest, the United States has 
just a 40% chance of winning when it shows up as the appellee. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of the Court Voting for the Govern-
ment as the Employment Rate Moves from Its Minimum to Maximum 
Values. Note: The panels in this figure show the predicted probability of Re-
publican and Democratic Courts ruling in favor of the government (as peti-
tioner and respondent) over the range of the values of the percentage changes 
in monthly employment based on the model in Table 1. The vertical lines are 
95% confidence intervals. All other variables (see Table 1) are set at their 
means or modes.123 
IV.  THE ECONOMY AS A SIGNAL OF GOVERNMENT 
(IN)COMPETENCE: A CONJECTURE   
What our data suggest—but not our theory—is that per-
ceived federal incompetence correlates to decreased levels of de-
ference to government positions. Indeed, none of the accounts 
we offered can explain our results. For traditional legal ap-
proaches,124 the correlation between the Court’s partisan com-
position and case outcomes is inexplicable; for political ap-
proaches,125 the correlation between the economy and the 
government success rate is equally curious. As for increased de-
ference in economic downturns, the data point in precisely the 
opposite direction: increased skepticism.  
To explain these rather odd results we offer the following 
conjecture: because recessionary periods may signal incompe-
 
 123. This figure was generated via S-Post, http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/ 
spost.htm.  
 124. See supra Part I.A. 
 125. See supra Part I.B. 
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tence on the part of the President and his advisors, the Court 
punishes them by altering its level of deference to the govern-
ment’s representative, the Solicitor General (and vice versa) in 
periods of economic prosperity.  
Recall that as a presidential appointee, vetted by the Se-
nate, the Solicitor General represents the views of the federal 
government in Supreme Court litigation.126 He defends these 
views and policies regardless of whether the nation’s finances 
are thriving or deteriorating.127 If the Justices view economic 
downturns as evidence of policymaking incompetence, then pro-
government outcomes are likely to decrease in recessionary pe-
riods. In short, rather than cooperating with the U.S. govern-
ment in addressing economic issues, the Justices will seek to 
dilute the policies that appear to effectuate more harm than 
good.  
The notion that the Justices will interpret variables such 
as high unemployment, inflation, or decreased GDP as a signal 
that the federal government is incapable of managing the econ-
omy is consistent with the extant literature that has explored 
this signaling theory in the context of voting.128 Numerous stu-
dies have shown that voters assess candidates quite differently 
in periods of economic upturns than downturns.129 Voters, in 
effect, view bad economic times as a cue that the current gov-
ernment is unable to manage the national economy and should 
be replaced.130 The Justices are not in a position to replace the 
incompetent policymakers, but they can refuse to implement 
their flawed programs.  
Given that Republican appointees are likely to maintain 
their majority on the Court for the foreseeable future, our con-
jecture holds mixed news for the next administration. If we are 
right and if the economy remains on the down side of the busi-
ness cycle, the Court may well compound the government’s 
 
 126. SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 106. 
 127. See generally id. at 106–33 (describing the role of the Solicitor General 
as representative of the government in front of the Supreme Court). 
 128. For a terrific collection of ten short essays noting the possible effects of 
economic factors on national elections, see Symposium, Forecasting the 2008 
National Election, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 679 (2008).  
 129. See, e.g., Brad Lockerbie, Election Forecasting: The Future of the Pres-
idency and the House, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 713, 713 (2008) (describing how the 
state of the economy may influence voters’ decisions).  
 130. See, e.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Charles Tren, The Job of President 
and the Jobs Model Forecast: Obama for ’08?, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 687, 687 
(2008) (arguing that the decreased amount of new jobs under a Republican 
President will cause more people to vote for Democrats in the 2008 election).  
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problems—punishing it through its rulings. On the other hand, 
if we are right and if the incoming President is able to usher in 
a period of economic prosperity, the United States should gen-
erally find itself on the winning side of the cases it appeals. 
But these are big ifs. Simply because our data are consis-
tent with the signaling conjecture should not be taken as evi-
dence of its truth; after all, we developed it to explain our re-
sults, as a new way of looking at the facts we collected. 
Confirming the signaling conjecture requires—as do all hypo-
theses—vulnerability. We must be able to prove ourselves 
wrong, which is impossible when we have developed a theory to 
fit the data. Accordingly, the task before us is to develop a new 
dataset before concluding that data confirm the conjecture. 
This is not, however, the only challenge we confront. In ad-
dition to collecting fresh data, we must deal with the many li-
mitations of the preliminary study we have presented here. To 
name just a few: 
Selection effects. As we noted earlier, it is entirely possible 
that the kinds of cases the government litigates, and the Jus-
tices decide to hear, differ during peaks and troughs in the 
business cycle. For purposes of this study, we decided to put 
this concern to the side. Because this was likely a perilous 
choice, in follow-up analyses we intend to make use of methods 
developed in the statistical sciences to deal with the selection 
problem we confront here.  
The Justices’ political preferences. For this study, we cap-
tured the Court’s political preferences with a measure keyed to 
the percentage of the Court appointed by a Republican Presi-
dent.131 While we believe that partisanship is the most relevant 
factor in decision making in the economics context—at least 
since 1953, the parties have staked out rather different and 
relatively clear positions—other formulations are possible. 
Moreover, in light of dominant theories in political science,132 it 
may be worthwhile to consider measures designed to tap the 
Justices’ ideology (if only as a robustness check). 
The political context. While legal and political models are 
quite prevalent in the social science literature, so is another: 
institutional accounts. These come in different flavors but the 
basic idea is straightforward enough: whether to maintain their 
legitimacy or to maximize their policy preferences (for example, 
 
 131. See supra p. 123 tbl.1. 
 132. See supra Part I.B. 
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to ensure that the ultimate state of law reflects, to the extent 
possible, their preferred policies), the Justices attend to the 
preferences and likely actions of the elected branches.133 We, in 
turn, should attend to this account in our model, incorporating 
variables designed to represent the preferences of the various 
political actors. Doing so would also enable us to detect whether 
Republican Courts, for example, defer to Republican govern-
ments—but not Democratic governments—during times of eco-
nomic crisis. 
The macroeconomy. Our statistical model houses six va-
riables to tap the macroeconomy—economic cycles, employ-
ment, inflation, GDP, consumer confidence, and consumer ex-
pectations with respect to prices. These may be the most 
obvious, and the most indicative of peaks and troughs in the 
business cycle, but they are not the only ones. In future studies, 
we intend to assess the robustness of our findings by consider-
ing other possible indicators. 
  CONCLUSION   
Scholars and commentators have long argued that Su-
preme Court Justices seek to advance legal and political goals 
in the decision-making process,134 but for just as long have ig-
nored the role the macroeconomy may play in disputes involv-
ing economic regulation. We sought to fill this gap by consider-
ing the effect of variables designed to tap the state of the 
macroeconomy—economic cycles, inflation, employment, GDP, 
consumer confidence, and expectations as to consumer prices—
even after controlling for the political composition of the Court. 
Advancing an economic theory of the Court that hypothesized 
heightened levels of teamwork, we expected to find that that 
the Justices would desire to cooperate with the other branches 
of government in recessionary times in order to promote na-
tional economic goals. Accordingly, we suspected they would be 
more likely to defer to the United States in periods of economic 
crisis. 
We were wrong. As it turns out, the government is less 
likely to prevail in times of recession and more likely to tri-
 
 133. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress, in SU-
PREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 240–
52 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing how shifts 
in the political climate of Congress may have an impact on the way Justices 
vote on the Supreme Court). 
 134. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.  
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umph in times of relative prosperity. A 1% increase in employ-
ment rates leads to a 13% increase in the government’s win 
rate, and all the other economic variables, while not statistical-
ly significant, show a similar trend.135 To explain these findings 
we offer a signaling conjecture: the Justices will interpret eco-
nomic downturns as signals that the federal policymakers are 
incompetently managing the economy, and thus will decrease 
their deference to the Solicitor General when the economy 
sours.  
We propose to test this conjecture in future studies, but for 
now it is the larger point that should not be missed: without 
consideration of business cycles at least in the area of economic 
regulation, the extant literature on judicial decision making is 
incomplete and in need of revision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135. See supra p. 125 fig.1. 
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  APPENDIX   
In what follows we supply more information on our meas-
ures of the macroeconomy. With respect to the figures, the 
graphs show how various measures cycles with the economy 
and chart larger macroeconomic trends.136 
A.  CORRELATION TABLE  
The tables below indicate that the historic values of our va-
riables of interest are nearly all highly correlated and in the 
expected direction. The first table indicates correlations for the 
five variables with data available since 1953. The second table 
indicates the correlations of all six variables since 1978.137 
 
 
 
 136. Additional data about the authors’ measures of the macroeconomy is 
available on their website. See Replication Archive, http://epstein.law 
.northwestern.edu/research/PoliticalEconomy.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 137. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data – FRED, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
FRED Data].  
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B.  THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
We used National Bureau of Economic Research data to 
determine when the country was in a state of recession—the 
period between a trough and peak. The table below provides 
the dates of recessions occurring during our sample, and the 
following table illustrates the cycle of recessions and expan-
sions.138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138. See Business Cycle, supra note 91; FRED Data, supra note 137.  
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Date Peak/Trough Contraction/Expansion 
(Months to Turning Point)  
October 1949 Trough 45 (Korean War) 
July 1953 Peak 10 
May 1954 Trough 39 
August 1957 Peak 8 
April 1958 Trough 24 
April 1960 Peak 10 
February 1961  Trough 106 (Vietnam War) 
December 1969 Peak 11 
November 1970 Trough 36 
November 1973 Peak 16 
March 1975  Trough 58 
January 1980 Peak  6 
July 1980  Trough 12 
July 1981  Peak 16 
November 1982  Trough 92 
July 1990  Peak 8 
March 1991  Trough 120 
March 2001  Peak 8 
November 2001  Trough 73 (Afghanistan/Iraq War) 
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